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Expectations regarding future events enable preparatory processes and allow for faster
responses to expected stimuli compared to unexpected stimuli. Expectations can have
internal sources or follow external cues. While many studies on expectation effects use
some form of cueing, a direct comparison with self-generated expectations involving
behavioral and psychophysiological measures is lacking. In the present study we com-
pare cue-induced expectations with self-generated expectations that are both expressed
verbally in a within-subjects design, measuring behavioral performance, and event-related
brain potentials (ERPs). Response time benefits for expected stimuli are much larger when
expectations are self-generated as compared to externally cued. Increased amplitudes in
both the N2 and P3 components for violations of self-generated expectations suggest that
this advantage can at least partially be ascribed to greater perceptual preparation. This
goes along with a missing benefit for stimuli matching the expected response only and is
mirrored in the lateralized readiness potential (LRP). Taken together, behavioral and ERP
findings indicate that self-generated expectations lead to increased premotoric prepara-
tion compared to cue-induced expectations. Underlying cognitive or neuronal functional
differences between these types of expectation remain a subject for future studies.
Keywords: self-generated expectations, cue-induced expectations, event-relatedbrain potentials,N2,P3, lateralized
readiness potential
INTRODUCTION
Expectations play a crucial role in action control. Research on
effect-based action control has stressed that representations of
anticipated action effects play a role when performing an action
(e.g., Nattkemper et al., 2010). According to the ideo-motor prin-
ciple (see Shin et al., 2010, for a recent review) the mental represen-
tation of an anticipated action effect triggers the action (similar to
forward and inverse computational models of motor control, e.g.,
Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000). For instance, the representation
of an open drawer might help us to initiate the pulling action. By
choosing actions according to the anticipated effects, people can
gain intentional control over their behavior (e.g., Kunde, 2001;
Pfister et al., 2010). They can consider expectations about upcom-
ing action effects for choosing between actions depending on
which effects they desire or not. As such, expectations about effects
stem from goals of the actor. They might not be directly caused
by current external stimulation, but rather be self-generated by
integrating goals and past external stimulation. Interestingly, this
view often does not directly translate to the methodology of exper-
iments on the role of action effect anticipation in action control.
For instance, the role of anticipated effects has been studied by
presenting action effects additionally as subliminal stimuli (e.g.,
Kunde, 2004) or irrelevant flankers (e.g., Zießler and Nattkemper,
2002). One could argue that presenting to-be-expected effects as
stimuli might trade experimental control against external validity,
as such a situation is not closely resembling action preparation dri-
ven by self-generated expectations. Conceivably, intentional action
control supposes self-generated expectations. These are likely to
interact with stimulus-based preparation but are unlikely identi-
cal to this. For instance, according to Kunde et al. (2007) actors use
anticipated action effects based on internal goals. Yet, stimuli have
an important role in this view, too. They disambiguate situations
as to whether or not an effect can be brought about by an action.
As many actions only lead to the desired outcomes in highly spe-
cific contexts, the role of a stimulus is to signal that in the current
context the link between expected effect and action is valid.
Taken together, this reasoning might suggest that the presumed
equivalence between self-generated expectations and cue-induced
expectations cannot be taken for granted. It is also conceivable
that self-generated expectations differ from expectations that are
directly triggered by external stimuli or cues. A similar distinc-
tion has been discussed with respect to internally triggered vs.
externally cued task switching (Arrington and Logan, 2005). Dif-
ferences between expectations based on external cues and internal
sources are also conceivable given the long history of debates con-
cerning motor patterns that are predominantly stimulus-triggered
vs. predominantly driven by a response goal. For instance, the
Baldwin–Titchener debate at the end of the nineteenth century
(e.g., Baldwin, 1895; Titchener, 1895) centered around the ques-
tion of whether or not response times (RTs) are regularly shorter
when people concentrate on the response rather than on expecting
the stimulus. An important insight of that debate was that people
can apparently choose between different modes for controlling the
same motor pattern.
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In line with these precursors, recent results point to differences
between intentional vs. reactive action. Surprisingly, a motor pat-
tern already triggered by an internal goal is incompatible with the
execution of the very same motor pattern in response to a stim-
ulus presented while the intentional action is in preparation (e.g.,
Astor-Jack and Haggard, 2005; Pfister et al., 2012). If an inter-
nally prepared action is truncated by a stimulus that requires the
same action that was intentionally prepared, RT costs result in
comparison to a situation where the response could be executed
without concurrent intentional preparation. The authors inter-
pret their results as evidence for distinct action systems that are
triggered either endogenously by intention or exogenously by an
imperative stimulus. Presenting the stimulus during intentional
action preparation therefore results in interference between both
systems and delays the action. In line with these results, Her-
wig et al. (2007) have differentiated two types of action control
modes, a stimulus-based action control mode and an intention-
based action mode. Pfister et al. (2011) have shown that previously
acquired action effect associations either impact performance or
not, depending on which of these two modes is operating. One can
of course debate what exactly differentiates the intention-based
from stimulus-based action mode (e.g., Neuringer and Jensen,
2010), however, empirical data highlights that different paths to
action do exist.
While our current study is inspired by recent work on effect-
based action control, we focus on distinguishing between self-
generated vs. cue-induced stimulus expectations. Such a focus
is feasible given that theories on integration of perception and
action (e.g., Hommel, 2009; Magen and Cohen, 2010) suggest that
action effects and stimuli share the same representational basis.
Studying self-generated vs. cue-induced expectations is driven by
the conjecture that anticipating appropriate environmental con-
ditions in order to prepare for efficient goal-directed actions is
one of the core abilities of our neurocognitive system (e.g., Kunde
et al., 2007). Anticipation, prediction, and expectancy are only
some of the labels used to discuss such mechanisms (e.g., Sutton
and Barto, 1981; Elsner and Hommel, 2001; Jentzsch and Sommer,
2002). Here we use the term expectation in a broad sense, encom-
passing both the process of expecting as well as the object of this
process. Expectations can originate from prior experience, when
events occurring with a high frequency in the past are expected
to be more likely to occur again in the future (e.g., Fitts et al.,
1963). Expectations may as well rest upon situational cues that
provide advance information about upcoming events (e.g., Posner
and Snyder, 1975). Whatever the source, performance is usually
boosted when the expected event occurs, whereas unexpected
events impair performance (e.g., Acosta, 1982).
Previous studies of expectation have often exclusively relied
on the use of external cues (e.g., Shulman et al., 1999; Oswal
et al., 2007). Cueing allows a more rigid experimental manip-
ulation of the induced expectations as compared to a setup
with self-generated expectations. However, before jumping to
the conclusion that cueing should be used to study expecta-
tion in general, potential functional differences between endoge-
nous and exogenous expectations should be scrutinized. To our
knowledge, the only direct comparison of self-generated and cue-
induced expectations was carried out by Acosta (1982). In a
series of experiments he pitted predictions verbalized by partici-
pants against cues (words that announced a certain stimulus and
were to be read aloud). As he included neutral expectations as
a control, he could differentiate the facilitation of correct expec-
tations from the cost of a wrong expectation. Furthermore, he
manipulated the expectation-target interval and found effects of
the interval duration in the prediction condition for both bene-
fits of matches and costs of mismatches. Benefits increased with
longer expectation-target intervals while costs were highest at
the shortest intervals. The effects were generally much smaller
in the cue condition. Mismatch costs were also highest at the
shorter intervals while no significant benefits for matches of cue-
induced expectations were found. In a second experiment he
manipulated the number of the response alternatives by map-
ping more than one stimulus to a response. The expectation
effect did not increase linearly with the number of alternative
responses, indicating that the process responsible for expecta-
tion effects is not just a scaling effect in choosing between the
possible alternatives to predict. Moreover, his findings suggested
that expectation effects were bound to stimulus processing rather
than to response processing. As multiple stimuli were mapped to
the same response, an expectation concerning a stimulus could
be violated while the response to be executed was the same
that would have been appropriate in case of a stimulus match-
ing the expectation. Responses in such trials were as slow as
those to unexpected stimuli with a different response. This sug-
gests that the expectation effect is not (solely) a part of response
execution.
Comparing different behavioral effects of self-generated vs.
cue-induced expectation, Acosta (1982) concluded that the types
of expectation differed only in the magnitude of their effects
but not qualitatively. It therefore appears expedient to study self-
generated vs. cue-induced expectations with respect to their effects
on action preparation including neural measures that are more
independent of the overt responses and could better differenti-
ate quantitative from qualitative effects. In the current study we
aimed to replicate the behavioral findings of Acosta (1982), show-
ing stronger effects of self-generated compared to cue-induced
expectations. Moreover, we used event-related brain potentials
(ERPs) to further distinguish the contribution of different cogni-
tive processes to expectation effects in these two conditions. This
includes potential differences between the two types of expec-
tation prior to stimulus presentation. Qualitative differences in
preparatory activity would be in accordance with theories that
assume different routes to action (e.g., Astor-Jack and Haggard,
2005; Kunde et al., 2007; Pfister et al., 2011).
Explicit self-generated expectations about upcoming stimuli
measured on a trial-by-trial basis (through verbalization) have
not been a focus of recent research. To analyze the processes
during the build-up of the expectations and response prepara-
tion, we used EEG recordings. There are two main questions we
wanted to address with this study. First, do differences between
the expectation types already exist prior to stimulus presenta-
tion? Second, which cognitive processes (perception, action selec-
tion, motor preparation) are influenced by expectation? More
specifically, do self-generated expectations affect other processes
than cue-induced expectations (qualitative differences between the
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expectation types) or affect the same processes but with a different
magnitude (quantitative differences)?
We manipulated the type of expectation within-subjects. In
the prediction condition participants had to verbally express their
expectation regarding the upcoming stimulus, in the cue condi-
tion they had to read aloud a word naming the upcoming stimulus.
Stimuli were simple shapes or colors. The task was then to react
as fast as possible to the imperative stimulus with the right or left
index finger. Since there were four stimuli, with two mapped to
each finger, three types of matches or mismatches existed. First,
for stimulus matches the expected (cued or predicted) stimulus
matched the upcoming stimulus. Second, for response matches
the expected stimulus did not match the upcoming stimulus but
required the same response. Third, for mismatches the expected
stimulus and the upcoming stimulus were different and did not
require the same response either.
In addition, we included a manipulation of stimulus frequency.
The two stimuli mapped to each finger were shown with dif-
ferent frequencies, at either 33 or 17% of all trials. Both hands
had to respond equally often. The frequency manipulation was
included to guide the participants’ predictions and to provide a
measure indicating whether participants base their predictions on
their experience (instead of random guessing). In a similar para-
digm, Umbach et al. (2012) have shown that participants closely
match their stimulus predictions to the observed frequencies. Even
though expectations in their study were not valid in predicting the
stimulus (similar to the current study) participants nonetheless
used these expectations in preparing their responses.
The role of expectation in action preparation can be studied by
comparing trials in which upcoming stimuli fulfill vs. do not fulfill
expectations in behavioral measures (RTs and errors, e.g., Acosta,
1982) or with regard to effects in the brain that can for instance
be measured by EEG (e.g., Matt et al., 1992; Jentzsch and Sommer,
2002). There are multiple processes that can lead to the expecta-
tion mismatch effects. It is possible that a correct expectation (a)
facilitates the encoding of the stimulus, (b) the response selection,
(c) response execution, or a combination of these. It is also pos-
sible that an expectation that does not match the stimulus delays
one of these processes, or else that both – fulfilled and unfulfilled
expectations – have opposing effects. Time differences in RTs and
the latencies of the different ERPs which occur during the different
stages prior to the response can help to show the stage(s) where
the expectations exert their influence. ERP amplitudes can provide
information about the magnitude of the involved processes in the
different conditions.
CONTINGENT NEGATIVE VARIATION
To investigate whether there is a difference of cue-induced vs.
self-generated expectation even before the stimulus is shown, we
charted the contingent negative variation (CNV). This is a slow
negative potential following an event cueing the upcoming target
stimulus (inducing expectations in our case). The CNV develops
in the cue-target interval and its amplitude is most pronounced
directly before onset of the imperative stimulus. Depending on
task demands, the late phase of the CNV reflects sensory, cognitive,
or motor preparation (Damen and Brunia, 1994; Fan et al., 2007).
Acosta (1982) has shown stronger RT effects in self-generated as
compared to cue-induced expectations. A possible cause of this
difference may be that the internal generation of expectations
results in a larger amount of specific preparation that could, con-
sequently, show up in a more pronounced CNV in the prediction
condition.
N2
The N2 is an ERP characterized by a larger amplitude in cases
where the stimulus deviates in form or context from the prevail-
ing stimulus (for a review, see Patel and Azzam, 2005). The N2
is also larger in response conflict trials as evoked by incongruent
flanker or no-go trials (Kopp et al., 1996). Therefore, we explored
whether mismatch between either kind of expectation and the
upcoming target would result in an enlarged N2 amplitude. Larger
interference effects in the N2 have been demonstrated in the Erik-
sen flanker task with a greater proportion of incongruent trials
(Tillman and Wiens, 2011). As the interference effect on RTs was
smaller in this condition, the N2 might reflect endogenous atten-
tion processes. If we assume that self-generated expectations have
a stronger influence on preparatory processes (e.g., attention), the
violation of an expectation might result in a larger N2 effect in the
prediction condition compared to the cue condition.
P3
Matt et al. (1992) and Jentzsch and Sommer (2002) differen-
tiated between passive and active forms of expectations. While
passive expectations automatically affect behavior, active expecta-
tions act in a rather controlled manner (Kahneman and Tversky,
1982). Matt and colleagues induced active expectations through
instruction (“Expect stimulus repetitions!”“Expect stimulus alter-
nations!”) in a blockwise manner. P3 amplitude as well as RTs
revealed the higher order repetition effects typically found in
simple reaction time tasks (stimulus repetitions benefit if they
continue a run of repetitions, alternations if they continue a run
of alternations). Importantly, the RT effect but not the P3 effect
was modulated by the instructed expectation (expecting repeti-
tions reduced the sequential effect for repetitions and increased
that for alternations, and vice versa). This dissociation suggests
that active and passive forms of expectation differentially affect
processing stages involved in performing the task but might not
show up in the P3.
However, operationalization of active and passive forms of
expectation differed between Matt et al. (1992) and the current
study. In contrast to their experimental approach, self-generated
expectations in the current study were allowed to change on
a trial-by-trial basis and were induced by stimulus frequency.
Self-generated expectations might lead to stronger P3 effects as
compared to cue-induced effects, because generating expectations
internally trial-by-trial might lead to more pronounced processing
of the expectation as compared to reading a cue. If one considers
the relation of stimulus to expectation (rather than considering
the stimulus alone), there are various possibilities for P3 effects.
On the one hand, it is possible that the P3 relates to expectation by
capitalizing on stimulus probability. In the current design, expec-
tations often mismatch the actual stimuli. Even if a participant
exclusively relies on the frequent stimulus, expectation matches
are rare. Therefore, upon stimulus presentation, a P3 could follow
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in case of matches. On the other hand, P3 may reflect the accu-
racy of a concrete expectation on a single-trial basis rather than
reflecting the past frequency of this expectation being fulfilled. In
this case, a stimulus mismatching the expectation should elicit the
higher P3 amplitude.
LATERALIZED READINESS POTENTIAL
At the other end of the processing stream, the lateralized readiness
potential (LRP) can be used to infer the role of response prepa-
ration in expectation effects (e.g., Jentzsch and Sommer, 2002).
The LRP is a difference waveform that arises with a higher activ-
ity in the motor area of the brain hemisphere contralateral to the
responding hand as compared to the ipsilateral hemisphere (Coles,
1989). The onset of the stimulus-locked LRP (S-LRP) provides a
chronometric index of premotor processing stages (Leuthold et al.,
1996) while onset differences in the response-locked LRP (LRP-R)
indicate processing differences at late motor-related stages (Hack-
ley and Valle-Inclán, 1998). Jentzsch and Sommer (2002) found
that S-LRP was significantly influenced by the expectations, while
the LRP-R was not. This shows that the instructed expectation
influenced a process after early stimulus processing (as P3 was
not affected in this study) but prior to the response initiation.
Accordingly, we assumed expectation effects specifically on the S-
LRP that should be particularly strong in case of self-generated
expectations.
INFLUENCES OF STIMULUS FREQUENCY
While the main focus of our experiment lay on the comparison of
cue-induced vs. self-generated expectations, the variation of stim-
ulus frequency we applied also needs to be briefly summarized.
Obviously the experimenter has little control over expectations
self-generated by participants. By varying stimulus frequency it
should be possible to partly shape self-generated expectations and
to be able to explore how self-generated expectations accommo-
date to the task environment (see Umbach et al., 2012). Specifically,
reliance on stimulus frequency can be considered a sign of subjec-
tive validity of the self-generated expectations that participants are
asked to verbalize. Furthermore, the more frequent stimuli should
lead to faster responses as compared to less frequent stimuli. Poten-
tial effects of stimulus frequency may in part be independent of
expectation match effects in the current trial (compare Jiménez
and Méndez,2012). Conceivably, stimulus frequency leads to a sus-
tained effect more similar to the passive form of expectation that
Matt et al. (1992) found reflected in the P3. We expected larger
P3 and N2 components for infrequent as compared to frequent
stimuli.
Furthermore, the CNV is seen to reflect preparatory processes
and the amplitude is, for example, modulated by cue validity (if
the upcoming stimulus is specified with different probabilities).
CNV amplitude is larger the more valid the cues (and thus, the
more expected the stimuli) are (Scheibe et al., 2009). We therefore
expect a larger CNV for the expectations of frequent stimuli since
these are more likely to be fulfilled (33 vs. 17% validity).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Eighteen participants (four men) with a mean age of 24.7 years
took part in the experiment. All Participants were right-handed
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The partici-
pants were either psychology students at Humboldt-Universität zu
Berlin and participated in exchange for course credit or received
a compensation of C20 for the experiment with a duration
of approximately two and a half hours. Participants gave their
informed consent prior to the experiment.
APPARATUS AND SOFTWARE
The Experiment was programmed with MathWorks MATLAB and
the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) and pre-
sented on a Windows computer. The participants’ expectations
were recorded using a table microphone and played to the experi-
menter who coded the predictions on a separate computer outside
the EEG booth. Error feedback after erroneous responses was given
via tabletop speakers.
STIMULUS MATERIAL AND EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION
The stimuli were either simple shapes (house, star, cross, and gate)
or colored circles (blue, red,green,and yellow) presented on a com-
puter monitor with a light gray background. Stimuli were 22 mm
in diameter, corresponding to a visual angle of about 2.1˚ at a view-
ing distance of approximately 60 cm. The experiment consisted
of two parts: a cue-induced (cue condition) and a self-generated
expectation variant (prediction condition). One of these parts was
performed with colors as stimuli and the other with shapes. The
order of the expectation variants as well as the assignment to the
two types of stimuli was randomized across participants.
In trials of the cue condition, the participants were presented
with the one-syllable word for one of the stimuli, which they were
instructed to read aloud (the German equivalents for house, star,
cross, and gate in the shape condition, or the German equivalents
for blue, red, green, and yellow in the color condition). In the pre-
diction condition they saw a prompt – the German equivalent for
“color?” or “shape?” – to which they should respond by naming
the stimulus they expected to appear in the current trial. Thus,
verbal output consisted of the same words in both expectation
conditions.
Participants had to react to the stimuli by pressing one of two
buttons with either the left or the right index finger. Depending
on the current type of stimuli, each button corresponded to two
forms or two colors. The mapping was randomized, shown before
the experiment and was trained during two training blocks. Of
the two stimuli per hand, one was presented in one out of three
trials (33%= frequent stimuli) and the others in one out of six
(17%= infrequent stimuli; half as often as the frequent stimuli),
together resulting in the same frequency (50%) of responses with
each hand. The order in which the stimuli were presented was
randomized. In the cue condition, the frequency of the cues was
matched to the frequency of the stimuli (cues for frequent stimuli
were shown in 33% of the trials, cues for infrequent stimuli in
17%). The task is shown in Figure 1.
TASK PROCEDURE AND INSTRUCTIONS
After being introduced to the lab and the experimental procedure,
participants provided their consent to participate and were seated
in a one person lab room and prepared for the EEG measure-
ments. Next a detailed explanation of the task in the following
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FIGURE 1 |Task used in the experiment. On each trial, participants either
had to read aloud the cue (in this case “star”) or to verbalize their prediction
for the upcoming stimulus (in this case “yellow”). After 1,000 ms the fixation
point appeared on screen and after another 1,500 ms the stimulus appeared
on screen (in this case red in the prediction trial, signifying a mismatch, and a
star in the cued trial, signifying a match). The participants manually responded
to the stimulus by pressing one of two keys. The next trial started 500 ms
after the response. The mapping of the stimulus types (shape, color) to the
expectation conditions and the order of the expectation conditions was
balanced over participants.
experiment and the stimulus-response mapping was presented
on the screen and also explained by the experimenter. Instruc-
tions explained the course of the trials, the response mappings
and the request to relax the mouth as soon as possible after
pronouncing the expectation (i.e., as soon as the fixation point
presented in response to the registration of the expectation). This
was included to ensure minimized muscle artifacts in the EEG
measurements.
The first training block of eight trials followed. After that, a
shorter version of the instructions was presented and any ques-
tions that arose during the first training block could be clarified
with the experimenter. This was followed by another training
block, after which the experimenter left the room and the par-
ticipant could start the experiment by pressing a button. The
experiment consisted of two parts, each containing five blocks
of 108 trials. The length of the breaks between the blocks could be
controlled by the participants. The second half of the experiment
contained a switching of the stimuli and expectation condition.
There were again two training blocks of eight trials each preceded
by instructions explaining the new task. To minimize mistakes, the
stimulus-response mapping was shown before every block. If the
wrong button was pressed an acoustic error feedback was given;
it was also given when no button had been pressed within 5 s
following stimulus presentation.
Each trial in the experimental blocks began with the presen-
tation of either the cue or the prompt for the expectation in the
middle of the screen. After 1,000 ms, the fixation point was shown
at the same point. After another 1,500 ms, the stimulus was shown
until a button press was registered or for 5 s if no reaction fol-
lowed during that time. This was followed by an intertrial interval
of 500 ms before the next trial started with the presentation of a
cue or prediction prompt.
At the end of the session participants were asked to estimate
the frequency of the characteristic stimulus values.
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RECORDINGS
Recordings were made from Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted in an
electrode cap (Easy-Cap) at 25 scalp positions (FP1, FP2, F3, F4,
F7, F8, C3, C4, T7, T8, P3, P4, P7, P8, O7, O8, O1, O2, FPz, Fz,
FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, Oz) according to the extended 10–20 system.
AFz served as ground electrode. In addition, external electrodes
were used for recording the vertical and horizontal electrooculo-
gram as well as for the mastoids. The electrodes were referenced
to the linked mastoids. Electrode impedance was kept below 5 kΩ.
The EEG was recorded with a sampling rate of 1,000 Hz and no
online filters were applied. Blink artifacts were corrected semi-
automatically by independent component analysis (ICA) using the
ICA algorithm integrated in the BrainVision Analyzer 2.0 (Brain-
Products GmbH). Offline, the continuous EEG was separated into
individual trials with 300 ms pre- and 2,700 ms post-cue epochs
(cue-locked data, in the prediction condition they were locked
to the presentation of the prompt), and 200 ms pre- and 800 ms
post-stimulus epochs (stimulus-locked data), and with 1,000 ms
pre- and 200 ms post-response epochs (response-locked data).
DATA ANALYSIS
For data analysis, only trials with correct key presses were con-
sidered. For the CNV, the cue-locked segments were averaged
according to the expectation condition (cue vs. prediction) and
frequency condition (expectation corresponded to frequent or
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infrequent stimulus) and 30 Hz low-pass filtered. For the statistical
analysis the difference between the mean voltage around the visual
potential of the fixation point (1,400–1,200 ms prior to stimulus
presentation) and the mean voltage 200 ms before the stimulus
onset at electrode Cz was used with the baseline 200 ms before the
onset of the cue or the prediction prompt. For the N2 and P3, the
stimulus-locked segments were averaged according to the expec-
tation conditions (cue vs. prediction) and match types (mismatch,
response match, and stimulus match) and 30 Hz low-pass filtered
(Butterworth, slope 12 dB/oct). The N2 amplitude was the mean
amplitude measured at Fz between 250 and 350 ms after stimulus
onset. P3 latency was measured as the time of the positive max-
imum at the Pz electrode during the time range of 250–550 ms
following stimulus onset. The P3 amplitude was measured as the
mean amplitude measured at Pz between 250 and 550 ms after
stimulus onset. For both N2 and P3 the baseline was taken during
a 200 ms pre-stimulus interval.
For the LRP, EEG was 5 Hz low-pass filtered (Butterworth, slope
12 dB/oct). The LRP was derived by computing difference waves
for the C3 and the C4 electrodes between the electrode contralat-
eral to the corresponding hand in a given trial and the ipsilateral
electrode. Then the two types of difference waves (C3–C4 for
right-hand response trials and C4–C3 for left-hand response tri-
als) were averaged within each of the experimental conditions
(cue mismatch, cue response match, cue stimulus match, predic-
tion mismatch, prediction response match, prediction stimulus
match). LRP onsets were analyzed using a jackknife-based pro-
cedure for factorial designs (Ulrich and Miller, 2001). Eighteen
different grand average LRPs for each of the experimental condi-
tions were computed by omitting the ERP data of one participant
from each grand average. This allowed to measure the usually
noisy LRP onsets much more precisely than on a single partici-
pant. LRP onsets were measured in the waveform of each grand
average and submitted to an ANOVA with F-values corrected
as F c= F /(n− 1)2, with F c as the corrected F-value and n as
the number of participants. S-LRP onsets were measured with
a 200 ms pre-stimulus baseline and LRP-R with a 100 ms base-
line, starting 100 ms after the responses were made. As Miller
et al. (1998) recommended, we used a relative criterion of 50%
of the maximal LRP amplitude during the recording epoch for
determining the LRP onsets for both the S- and the R-locked LRPs.
SPEECH ARTIFACTS AND VERBALIZATION LATENCY
The participants were asked to verbalize their expectation as soon
as the prompt or cue was shown and to relax their facial mus-
cles again as soon as the fixation point was shown. The EEG data
acquired during the time of speech was not analyzed. The earliest
data points used in the analysis were in the Cz amplitude (CNV),
starting 100 ms after the presentation of the fixation point, which
should render enough time for artifacts from muscles involved
in the prior speech production to subside. Visual inspection of
the microphone recordings showed activations in the frequency
range of speech primarily prior to the presentation of the fixa-
tion point. In addition, the stimulus types and their mapping to
the expectation condition and frequencies were randomized; thus
their verbalization should not have been able to systematically
influence any EEG measurements. Furthermore, participants were
instructed to use the relatively long interval between the prompt
or cue and the fixation point for blinking if necessary.
Analyzing processing differences with chronometric measures
(as comparing ERP latencies) presumes equivalent starting points
of the processes of interest. In our case it is assumed that possi-
ble preparatory processes start with the verbalization of either the
prediction or the cue, respectively. Possibly, however, it is harder
to generate a prediction than to read a cue. If, because of this,
predictions are verbalized later than cues that have simply to be
read aloud, preparation, on the one hand, may start later in the
prediction condition and, on the other hand, the distance in time
between the verbalization and the imperative stimulus would be
shorter for predictions than for cues. Both influences would make
a comparison of the time courses of the prediction and cue condi-
tions problematic. Being aware of these difficulties we conducted
a behavioral pilot study with the same materials that allowed a
precise measurement of voice onset times. Moreover, anticipating
possible differences in verbalization latency, we locked the time
of stimulus presentation in this pilot study to voice onset time
rather than using a fixed interval between prompt/cue and stim-
ulus as in the main study reported here. The stricter controlled
pilot study revealed the same behavioral effects of expectation as
the EEG study. Importantly, we found no difference in verbaliza-
tion latency between predictions and cues (though the different
standard deviations may mirror a processing difference between
producing one and the same word as a prediction or by reading)1
and decided for a fixed interval between prompt/cue and stimulus
in the main study in order to avoid problems with incompatibilities
between speech recognition and precise EEG recording.
RESULTS
EXCLUSION OF DATA
Training blocks were not analyzed. Furthermore, error trials were
excluded from the RT and EEG analyses. Trials in which the
participants had not reacted after 5 s were counted as error tri-
als. According to this criterion 2.6% of all trials were excluded.
Response time analyses were based on medians per participant
and condition. Due to the experimental design, roughly twice as
many mismatch trials went into the analysis compared to response
matches and stimulus matches; this proportion was similar for
both expectation conditions2. Predictions were matched by the
correct stimulus in 25.9% of trials while cues were valid in 27.7%.
BEHAVIORAL DATA
Response times and error rates can be seen in Figure 2. RT was on
average 72 ms longer for mismatches than for stimulus matches.
This slowing was about the same for response match and com-
plete mismatch trials. Match trials were also more accurate than
mismatch trials. The advantage of stimulus matches was larger
for the prediction condition (Figure 2, left; 113 ms) than for the
1Voice onset time results from the behavioral pilot study; predictions: M = 467 ms
(SD= 117.03), cues: M = 465 ms (SD= 49.05), t (9)= 0.08, ns.
2Number of trials, excluding errors: predictions: mismatch M = 257 (SD= 13);
response match M = 127 (SD= 11); stimulus match M = 138 (SD= 11); cues:
mismatch M = 268 (SD= 7); response match M = 119 (SD= 5); stimulus match
M = 149 (SD= 4).
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FIGURE 2 | Response times and error rates. Response times (outer bars)
exhibit an effect of match (with faster responses to stimulus matches than
to response matches and mismatches) and an interaction with expectation
condition (with a stronger effect of match in the self-generated predictions,
left). The same pattern is visible in the error rates (inner bars). There were
less errors made in the match trials, thus the effect in response times
cannot be explained by a speed-accuracy trade-off. Error bars represent
confidence intervals (95%) for repeated-measures designs according to
Loftus and Masson (1994) and Jarmasz and Hollands (2009).
cue condition (Figure 2, right; 31 ms). Additionally, the RTs were
17 ms shorter for the frequent stimuli compared to infrequent
stimuli. A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA with expecta-
tion condition, match and frequency as within-subjects factors
on the median RTs rendered a significant main effect of fre-
quency, F(1, 17)= 32.96, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.66, and of match,
F(2, 34)= 316.38, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.95 ; there was no main effect
of expectation condition, F(1, 17)= 0.06, ns. Importantly, there
was a significant interaction of match and expectation condition,
F(2, 34)= 36.78, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.68 , with a larger difference
between the two types of mismatch and the stimulus match for the
prediction condition than for the cue condition. T -tests revealed
that for both expectation conditions there was no significant dif-
ference between mismatch and response match [both t (17)< 1.46,
ns], while the stimulus match was significantly faster than both [all
t (17)> 6.69, p< 0.001, all d > 3.38]. The effect of match on the
error rates was in the same direction, F(2, 34)= 7.13, p= 0.003,
η2p = 0.30 , with less errors for stimulus matches as compared
to mismatches. The effects can therefore not be explained by a
speed-accuracy trade-off.
The frequency manipulation was reflected in the prediction
behavior, as participants predicted the more frequent stimuli on
a larger proportion of trials,χ2(1)= 7.39, p= 0.007. The post hoc
estimates of stimulus occurrence in % made by the participants
also provide a good approximation of the actual frequencies,
with the frequent stimuli at 59%, and the infrequent stimuli at
41% (for comparison, real presentation frequencies: 66 and 33%,
respectively).
CONTINGENT NEGATIVE VARIATION
The CNV was neither influenced by the expectation condition nor
by the frequency. A repeated-measures ANOVA for the influence
of frequency and expectation condition revealed no main effect
of expectation condition, F(1, 17)= 1.29, ns, or of frequency, F(1,
17)= 1.64, ns, and no interaction, F(1, 17)= 0.92, ns.
N2
Figure 3 (top) shows the N2 for the prediction and the cue condi-
tion at electrode Fz. The N2 amplitude was larger for the cue con-
dition than for the prediction condition, and in both expectation
conditions the N2 was larger for mismatches and response matches
than for stimulus matches. The amplitude difference of response
matches and mismatches compared to stimulus matches was larger
for the prediction than for the cue condition. A repeated-measures
ANOVA for the effects of match type and expectation condition
on the mean amplitude of the N2 measured at Fz between 250
and 350 ms revealed a main effect for match, F(2, 34)= 15.52,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.48 and a main effect for expectation condition,
F(1, 17)= 39.14, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.70. The interaction was based
on a larger amplitude difference between the different match types
for the prediction condition compared to the cue condition, F(2,
34)= 6.79, p= 0.003, η2p = 0.29. A three-way repeated-measures
ANOVA that also included the influence of frequency on the
N2 peak amplitude rendered no main effect of frequency, F(1,
17)< 0.01, ns.
P3
The P3 (Figure 3, bottom) had a larger amplitude for predictions
compared to cues and for mismatches compared to stimulus and
response matches. In the cue condition the full stimulus match
exhibited the smallest P3 amplitude, with a higher amplitude for
response matches and the highest amplitude for mismatches. In
the prediction condition the pattern was more complex, with stim-
ulus matches showing a much shorter peak latency of the P3
compared to all other conditions. A repeated-measures ANOVA
for the effects of match type and expectation condition on the
mean amplitude of the P3 revealed a main effect for match, F(2,
34)= 14.16, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.45, a main effect for expectation
condition,F(1, 17)= 16.23,p< 0.001,η2p = 0.49, and a significant
interaction, F(2, 34)= 6.83, p< 0.003, η2p = 0.29. A three-way
repeated-measures ANOVA that also included the influence of
frequency on the P3 mean amplitude rendered no effect of fre-
quency, F(1, 17)= 0.23, ns. There was a significant effect of match
on the peak latency, F(2, 34)= 17.20, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.50. A
t -test revealed that this was due to the earlier P3 for stimulus
matches in the prediction condition. The P3 for stimulus matches
in the prediction condition began on average 85 ms earlier than
for mismatches, t (17)= 5.57, p< 0.001, d = 2.70.
LATERALIZED READINESS POTENTIAL
The onset of the S-LRP was earlier for stimulus matches than
for response matches and mismatches, mirroring the RT results
(Figure 4, top). A repeated-measures ANOVA for the influence of
match and expectation condition on the S-LRP onset rendered a
main effect of match, F(2, 34)= 24.33, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.59 , but
not of expectation condition. There was a trend toward an interac-
tion,F(2, 34)= 2.58, p= 0.090,η2p = 0.13, with a larger difference
between the S-LRP onset latency for the stimulus match compared
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FIGURE 3 | ERPs at midline electrodes Fz, Cz, and Pz time-locked to
stimulus onset. Prediction condition is shown on the left, cue condition on
the right. For each electrode the different waveforms for the three match
types are shown. Analysis windows for N2 and P3 components are
highlighted in gray. Stimulus matches are marked by the solid line, response
matches by the dashed line, and mismatches by the dotted line. The
interaction of match and expectation condition can best be seen at the Fz
electrode for the N2 and at the Pz electrode for the P3.
to the response match and mismatch in the prediction condition
compared to the cue condition.
As can be seen in Figure 4 (top) there was an early rise of
the response match S-LRP (especially in the prediction condition)
which then soon aligned with the mismatch S-LRP. According
to this visual inspection we also analyzed the average S-LRP
amplitude 150–250 ms after stimulus onset. A repeated-measures
ANOVA for the influence of match and expectation condition on
the S-LRP amplitude 150–250 ms after stimulus onset revealed a
main effect of match, F(2, 34)= 19.44, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.53 ,
but not of expectation condition. There was a significant interac-
tion of expectation condition and stimulus match condition, F(2,
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FIGURE 4 |Top: stimulus-locked LRP waveforms for the prediction
condition (left) and cue condition (right).There was an earlier S-LRP onset
for stimulus matches than for mismatches and response matches. (Onsets
are marked by the short vertical lines intersecting the waveforms.) This onset
difference was, in trend, larger for the prediction condition. Although the
response match S-LRP onset is as late as for mismatches, they differ in their
amplitude before S-LRP onset (50% of the maximum amplitude) in the time
interval 150–250 ms following stimulus onset (highlighted in gray). The
response match amplitude rises in the correct direction as with the stimulus
match and is significantly higher than the mismatch amplitude, but only in the
prediction condition. Bottom: response-locked LRP waveforms for the
prediction condition (left) and cue condition (right). There is only a significant
effect of match with an earlier LRP-R onset for stimulus matches compared to
response matches and mismatches.
34)= 3.92, p= 0.029, η2p = 0.19. The average S-LRP amplitude
in the prediction condition in this interval was 0.29µV higher for
response matches than for mismatches, t (17)= 2.20, p= 0.042,
d = 1.06 but there was no such difference in the cue condition,
t (17)= 0.65, ns. Even though it was not reflected in the response
time this finding indicates an early correct motoric activation for
response matches in the prediction condition.
The onset latency of the LRP-R was influenced only by match,
F(2, 34)= 5.21, p= 0.011, η2p = 0.24 but not by the expectation
condition; there was no interaction (Figure 4, bottom).
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to shed some light on the basic
processes that underlie the effects of expectation on the control
of performance. We were especially interested in distinguishing
between the consequences of self-generated expectations (pre-
dictions) vs. cue-induced expectations. On each trial participants
verbalized an expectation prior to stimulus onset in a two-choice
discrimination task. The expectation was either freely generated
by the participants (prediction) or specified by an external cue (a
word denoting the discriminating stimulus feature). Our results
suggest that when investigating effects of explicit expectation one
should be aware of possible differences between internally and
externally triggered anticipation processes: predictions showed
stronger behavioral effects and stronger effects on most ERP com-
ponents after stimulus presentation that are related to expectation.
The two types of expectation showed different aftereffects once a
matching or mismatching stimulus was presented. Predictions,
therefore, differed substantially from cue-induced expectations.
Direct comparisons of behavioral and neuronal indicators
between expectations induced by cues vs. self-generated expec-
tations have been lacking so far. With respect to behavioral differ-
ences between the two types of expectation we replicated Acosta
(1982). RTs were slower when the stimulus did not match the
expectation as compared to a match. This difference was larger in
the prediction than in the cue condition. Moreover, as in Acosta’s
study, we found no benefit of response match trials over complete
mismatch trials, suggesting that the expectation exerts its influence
before response preparation. The results of error rates reflected
RTs, contradicting a speed-accuracy trade-off. Additionally, as a
www.frontiersin.org December 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 562 | 9
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kemper et al. Self-generated vs. cue-induced expectations
consequence of the frequency manipulation in our experiment,
participants also responded faster to the more frequent stimuli.
In the following we shall first discuss the relevant aspects of the
ERP results on self-generated vs. cue-induced expectations. We
shall then discuss how type of expectation might relate to similar
distinctions in other aspects of action control.
STRONGER ERP EFFECTS FOR PREDICTIONS VS. CUES
The CNV did not reveal any differences between predictions and
cues. If at all, differences in the cue-target interval between both
conditions showed up in an early time window starting 450 ms
after cue onset. This was, however, the time window compris-
ing the speech artifacts. Furthermore, participants were instructed
that blinks should be synchronized with speaking aloud. Although
the time window of this cue-related positive deflection resembled
those found in task switching paradigms (e.g., Nicholson et al.,
2005; Li et al., 2012) we refrain from further interpretation until
this positivity is replicated in a design excluding artifacts.
In the ERPs related to stimulus processing we found differ-
ences with respect to expectation match that were modulated by
the source of expectation (prediction vs. cue). The N2 ampli-
tude for response match and complete mismatch trials was larger
than for stimulus match trials, and this difference was significantly
larger in the prediction condition. The N2 has been reported to
be larger for incompatibly cued stimuli (Kopp et al., 1996) and
interpreted as reflecting cognitive control functions concerning
incorrect response preparations. Thus, our results might reflect
the need to control the prepared incorrect responses for stimulus
mismatch trials. However, in case of a response match the response
associated with the unexpected stimulus is correct in our experi-
ment. Our finding of equal N2 amplitudes for response match and
complete mismatch trials indicates that the control processes are
triggered by the pure stimulus mismatch. This corresponds to the
view that interprets the N2 as a sign of mismatch or conflict detec-
tion (e.g., Folstein and Van Petten, 2008; Nigbur et al., 2011). Our
data suggests that the effect is elicited by the stimulus violating the
expectation rather than by the response associated with a different
stimulus than the one presented.
Expectation effects on the N2 are larger in the prediction con-
dition. As the probability of a violation of the expectation was
comparable for the prediction and the cue conditions it is unlikely
that the match effect in the N2 mirrors just the probability of
conflict. This finding corresponds to the view that preparing for a
self-generated prediction involves endogenous attention processes
to a greater degree as preparing for a cued stimulus. Further-
more, the N2 amplitude was generally higher in the cue condition.
Though this main effect does not relate to our hypotheses, one
might speculate that it possibly also reflects the“expectation mode”
(self-generated vs. externally triggered). Presumably, expectations
were weaker in the cue condition so that stimuli were generally
“less expected” as compared to the prediction condition. This cor-
responds to the smaller expectation effects we found for the cue
condition in the behavioral data and the other ERPs.
We obtained an interaction of match and expectation condi-
tion for the P3 amplitude. While usually higher P3 amplitudes
have been found for infrequent stimuli (Fabiani et al., 1987), we
were able to demonstrate a frequency-independent influence of
subjective expectation on the P3. Our results differ from those
of Jentzsch and Sommer, 2002, who did not find an influence of
explicit expectation on the P3. A possible reason for this discrep-
ancy may lie in methodological differences. In contrast to Jentzsch
and Sommer, 2002; see also Matt et al., 1992), we allowed expecta-
tions to fluctuate on a trial-by-trial basis instead of manipulating
them by instruction at a block-level. Inducing an expectation
at the beginning of a block of trials might lead to a situation
where this expectation is implemented for action preparation
early on and afterward might be effective in action preparation
on lower levels of representation while no longer being strongly
represented as an expectation proper (compare e.g., Wenke et al.,
2009, for a similar argument with respect to the implementation
of instructed stimulus-response links). Furthermore our experi-
mental approach differed from the one in the above studies in that
we required participants to generate explicit expectations them-
selves instead of being asked to hold a specific expectation given
by instructions. As a consequence, the design of the present study
might have been more sensitive to detecting small effects on P3
amplitudes. Concluding from our data, we suggest that explicit
self-generated expectation indeed affects early stimulus processing
stages, even stronger so than cue-induced expectations.
There was a much earlier P3 peak for stimulus matches as
compared to mismatches in the prediction condition. Though the
component was similar in its form to the other experimental con-
ditions, conceivably, some kind of signal of prediction success or
affirmation might have played a role if the self-generated expec-
tation proved to be correct. Usually, the latency of the P3 peak
reflects the time of uncertainty resolution. Sutton et al. (1967)
showed this for match trials in an experiment with explicit self-
generated expectations about upcoming auditory stimuli (either
single or double clicks). They analyzed match trials in which sin-
gle clicks were expected. The P3 latency depended on the latency
of the possible (unexpected) second click. In the conditions with
earlier second clicks the P3 was also earlier because the uncertainty
about whether the expectation matched could be resolved earlier.
This does not explain why in our study the P3 is so much ear-
lier for stimulus matches only in the prediction condition, while
in the cue condition the P3 is as late for stimulus matches as for
mismatches. In the cue condition, uncertainty regarding the cor-
rectness of preparation should be resolved similarly early as in
the prediction condition. However, in accordance with the idea
that self-generated expectations result in more preparation than
cue-induced expectations, a stronger impact of uncertainty reso-
lution in the prediction condition seems plausible. We looked at
the scalp distribution for this component in order to check if there
is an additional process responsible for the latency difference, but
the distribution did not differ from the distributions around the
P3 for the other conditions.
Furthermore, we found no frequency effect for the N2 or P3.
Even though frequency affected RTs, these effects do not seem to
stem from the processes involved in the generation of the N2 or
P3. In contrast to our hypothesis and the results from Jentzsch and
Sommer (2002), the more passive form of expectation generated
by the stimulus frequency had no effect on the ERPs. This could
be due to the relatively small frequency differences of the four
stimuli. As the expectations for the more frequent stimuli in our
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experiment happened to be matched by the stimulus more often
than for the infrequent stimuli, an effect of frequency or an inter-
action of frequency and condition could also have been expected to
influence the CNV. Expectation validity has been shown to affect
CNV amplitude (Scheibe et al., 2009). However, there were no
effects of the frequency manipulation on the CNV in our data,
perhaps due to the relatively small differences in stimulus fre-
quency that resulted in equally small differences in expectation
validity. Although two of the four possible stimuli were shown
twice as often as the other two, the absolute difference in validity
between frequent and infrequent stimuli amounted to only 17%
(as compared to 25% differences and an overall higher validity, 50
vs. 75 and 100%, in Scheibe et al., 2009).
The LRP results only partially reflect our predictions. As
expected, the S-LRP onset reflected the RT results for the different
match types, showing that these effects are the result of premotoric
processing stages. The interaction with the influence of the expec-
tation condition only approached significance. In contrast to our
hypothesis and the results of Jentzsch and Sommer (2002) there
was a significant effect of match type on the LRP-R onset, similar
to the S-LRP onset and the RT, with an earlier onset for stimulus
matches than for the two mismatch types. That is, motor prepara-
tion started earlier in those cases with fast response selection. The
expectation condition, however, did not affect motor preparation
as measured by the LRP-R.
Response matches did not differ from complete mismatches in
behavioral performance. Although response matches call for the
same response as indicated by the cue or prediction, we did not find
any benefit compared to complete mismatches. This finding sug-
gests that response preparation depends on the imperative stim-
ulus. Similarly, the N2 and P3 amplitude did not differ between
response matches and mismatches whereas response matches dif-
fered significantly from stimulus matches in N2 and P3 amplitude
measures. The facilitation of stimulus matches is reflected in the
S-LRP onset and can, therefore, be attributed to perceptual and/or
central parts of the preparation process. There was no difference
between response matches and complete mismatches in the S-LRP
and the LRP-R onset was similarly late for response match and
mismatch. This is partly in line with what the theory of event cod-
ing (TEC; Hommel, 2009) would predict. Event codes are abstract
codes encompassing features of perceived stimuli and (to be) pro-
duced actions. According to TEC, stimulus and response features
are integrated into one event code. Event codes might be formed
and retrieved both during prediction/cue processing and when
the stimulus is presented and responded to (compare e.g., Wenke
et al., 2007). Connecting and disconnecting features in an event
code takes processing time. Thus, if we assume that explicit expec-
tation provides some form of “preparative” event code, response
matches, and complete mismatches should take longer than stim-
ulus matches, in which all links set up by the expectation can be
kept. This prediction is met by our data. However, TEC further pre-
dicts that complete mismatches are faster than response matches
because a new event code is formed instead of disconnecting old
and connecting new features as in the case of a response match
(in a response match trial the predicted response has to be kept,
but in combination with another stimulus). This prediction is
not met because complete mismatches behaviorally do not differ
significantly from response matches, and, in tendency, are rather
slower than response matches.
Overall, S-LRP results mostly reflected behavioral performance.
However, with self-generated predictions, both stimulus and
response matches lead to an initial rise in the S-LRP, indicating
an activation of the corresponding response. In the later course a
faster rise for stimulus matches results in the S-LRP passing the
onset threshold (defined at 50% of the peak amplitude) much
earlier, while response matches do not pass this threshold before
mismatches. This pattern suggests a preactivation of the correct
response that was then inhibited due to the reevaluation after a
different stimulus was shown. Presumably, inhibition seems to
commence in response matches as soon as the mismatch between
expected and presented stimulus is detected. This is interesting
with regard to the role of stimuli in goal-directed action that Kunde
et al. (2007) offer. They suggest that actions are generally goal-
oriented and stimuli primarily serve to disambiguate between two
variants: (1) a specific effect can be expected to follow an action
in the current context, or (2) a goal is likely unattainable in the
current context. Even simple actions such as button presses or
operations of switches can have different effects depending on
context factors. Presumably, the early S-LRP in response matches
is indicating that action preparation, turning the expectation into
an action goal, is no longer fostered (or even inhibited) once the
stimulus signals a mismatch with the expectation.
DIFFERENTIATING TYPES OF EXPECTATION
We suggest that it is necessary to differentiate between self-
generated and cue-induced expectations. This might be infor-
mative for research proposing similar distinctions with respect
to other aspects of action control. For instance, in research on
effect-based action control the role of action mode (free choice vs.
stimulus-driven) in the acquisition (e.g., Herwig et al., 2007; Her-
wig and Waszak, 2012; Janczyk et al., 2012) or application (Pfister
et al., 2011; Gaschler and Nattkemper, submitted) of action effect
associations is under current debate. We suggest that effect antici-
pation might have an especially strong impact on action control if
it is based on expectations about effects that stem from goals of the
actor rather than being directly caused by current external stim-
ulation. Expectations that are generated internally by integrating
goals and past external stimulation might be represented more
strongly as compared to cue-induced expectations, as the former
need to be shielded against competing external stimulation (com-
pare e.g., Dreisbach and Haider, 2008). When relying on cues that
are present on each trial, a strong representation is not established
as it is not necessary (compare e.g., Ballard et al., 1995).
We explain our results by a difference between self-generated
and cue-induced expectations. A reviewer suggested an alternative
account according to which the response time and ERP differences
might be based on just one kind of expectation that plays out dif-
ferently in these two experimental conditions. For instance, one
could assume that the participant’s expectation is in most cases
validly reflected in the prediction condition. Thus, in most trials
the participant would be expecting exactly what she or he verbally
indicates. In contrast, a randomly presented cue might mirror the
expectation on just some of the trials. While the cue suggests the
expectation of a specific stimulus, the participant might not always
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follow this suggestion and often expect a different stimulus instead.
By this account, expectation effects in the cueing condition might
be as strong as in the prediction condition for the subset of trials in
which participants expect what the cue suggests. It would be even
conceivable that in this subset of trials of the cueing condition
expectation effects might be stronger than those of the prediction
condition, as potentially cues and internally generated predictions
could be combined. However, as there is possibly a substantial
proportion of trials in which participants do not follow the cue,
one could expect that effects are on average smaller in the cue-
ing condition as compared to the prediction condition. Though
our experiment was not designed to test this alternative account,
we analyzed reaction time data to evaluate this idea. According to
the above view there should be no (or even a reversed) difference
between the cueing and the prediction condition in the subset of
trials in which there was likely a match between cue and internally
generated expectation. This should be the case for the fastest 10%
of match trials in the cueing condition. Percentile analyses did
not support this conjecture. The 10% fastest match trials in the
cue condition were slower than the 10% fastest match trials in the
prediction condition [∆= 27.39 ms; t (17)= 2.77, p= 0.013].
A second possibility to address this concern is to scrutinize the
influence of stimulus lag on the match effect in the cue condition.
A typical fallacy often underlying predictions is the tendency to
increasingly expect a stimulus alternation after longer runs of rep-
etitions, also known as the “gambler’s fallacy” (Ayton and Fischer,
2004). If a cue-independent internally generated expectation is
effective in the cueing condition, a stimulus should be increasingly
expected the longer it has not been presented. Indeed, in our sam-
ple the mean prediction probability for a stimulus increased from
16% when it had been presented two trials before to 30% when the
last presentation was five or more trials back. The probability to
predict a first-order repetition was on average 25%. All contrasts
between the prediction probabilities for a stimulus presented at
lag 1 (repetition prediction) to lag 5 or more were statistically sig-
nificant. So, the predictions of our participants seem to reflect a
mixture of a “gambler’s fallacy”-like alternation bias and a first-
order repetition bias. Therefore, if the cue matches a stimulus that
has not been presented for several trials, the likelihood for the cue
matching the “real” expectation should be highest. Consequently,
one would expect the largest match effect at the longest lag of tri-
als. We reanalyzed RTs of stimulus match and complete mismatch
trials (there were not enough data points in some cells for response
matches) of the cue condition. We found an effect for match, F(1,
17)= 38.75, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.70, with no differences between
lags [interaction match× lag: F(1, 17)= 1.43, p= 0.232], while
RTs generally increase over lags for match and mismatch trials
(main effect of lag: F(1, 17)= 8.88, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.34). In the
case of a stimulus repetition the effect tended to be larger (41 ms),
rather than smaller, compared to the effect at longer lags (22, 20, 25,
and 20 ms, for lags 2, 3, 4, and more than 4, respectively). Currently,
our data does not support the view that there is only one kind of
expectation effective in both the cueing and prediction condition.
Rather, the data suggests that expectation in the cueing condition
is different from expectation in the prediction condition. As these
post hoc analyses provide only preliminary arguments, the task
to disentangle the interactions between internal and externally
motivated expectation remains open to future research.
One can further argue that self-generated expectations can not
be controlled experimentally to the same extent as cue-induced
expectations. Yet we suggest that it is warranted to (also) use
self-generated expectations for studying effects of expectation on
goal-directed action. Research on task switching has witnessed a
similar case where presumably external validity and experimental
control have to be balanced. It could be shown that a voluntarily
initiated task choice results in different behavioral effects as com-
pared with the situation where the task set to be implemented is
triggered by a cue: voluntary task switches lead to much smaller
task switching costs than cued task switches (Arrington and Logan,
2005). Thus, not only in the preparation of simple actions but also
at the superordinate level of task sets there are differences between
self-initiated and externally triggered processes. Participants in the
Arrington and Logan (2005) study were instructed to choose freely
between two possible tasks (with about the same frequency and
in an approximately random manner). Thus, they decided on a
task to prepare for, or, to put it differently, they expected to exe-
cute the chosen task as soon as the stimulus appeared (cf. Kunde
et al., 2007). Accordingly, after being cued, they prepared to exe-
cute the task given by the cue. This situation, therefore, is similar
to the approach of the current study: performance differences are
observed as a consequence of preparation determined by inter-
nal or external sources. However, it is not clear if the differences
are based on qualitative differences between internally or exter-
nally initiated task preparation processes, or if it may already be
the source of expectation generation (i.e., before any preparation
starts) that affects the consecutive task processes.
The findings from voluntary task switching suggest that the
two paths to action might already differ prior to stimulus presen-
tation. Accordingly, expectations prior to stimulus presentation
may vary and differently affect action preparation depending on
whether they are cue-induced or self-generated. Moreover, the
idea of stimulus-based and intention-based action control modes
(e.g., Herwig et al., 2007) can be mapped to what is (not) nec-
essary to build-up explicit stimulus expectations in cueing vs.
self-generation: while cues can potentially act as rather automatic
triggers for a specific expectation (e.g., Bargh and Chartrand,
1999), the requirement to generate predictions can only be fulfilled
intentionally (compare e.g., Jahanshahi et al., 2006). As expecta-
tions are a part of the action it seems plausible that participants
are more likely to be in an intention-based mode if they generate
expectations themselves. Moreover, expected or unexpected stim-
uli in this context represent feedback (i.e., action effects) to the
expectations, and the contingency between expectations and stim-
uli should impact performance to a larger extent if it is acquired in
an intention-based mode (Pfister et al., 2011). This could explain
the performance differences between prediction and cue trials in
Acosta’s (1982) and our study.
The difference between self-generated and cue-induced expec-
tations and their role in action control requires further study. We
have demonstrated that these types of expectation differ in a situ-
ation in which both are explicitly verbalized using the same words
as output (naming the predicted differentiating stimulus feature
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vs. reading the cue word of this feature). A study trying to gen-
eralize the different expectation effects beyond this specific verbal
task seems promising. Furthermore, it is necessary to test accounts
of how and why self-generated and cue-induced expectations dif-
fer. As of yet, it is not clear whether the two types of expectation
differ qualitatively or quantitatively. Self-generated expectations
might either show stronger and/or qualitatively different effects
on action preparation and performance. For instance, one could
argue that a difference in the results might simply be due to an
artifact in the methods used to induce the two types of expecta-
tion. On the one hand, reading aloud the cues does not enforce
deep processing. In an implicit sequence learning study with a
repeating sequence of to be read words, Hartman et al. (1989)
demonstrated a surprising lack of explicit and even implicit learn-
ing. Generating the predictions, on the other hand, might enforce
deeper processing for various reasons. For instance, participants
were instructed that expectations should not be the same all the
time. The experimenter was present outside the EEG booth cod-
ing the expectations online. Thus, the self-generated expectations
were constrained such that they should be somewhat variable
from trial-to-trial, avoiding perseverance and obvious patterns.
This likely enforced that participants allocated a substantial part
of their resources to the expectations in the prediction version of
the task (compare e.g., Rapoport and Budescu, 1997).
Looking for functional differences between different types of
expectation, Bubic et al. (2009, 2010) employed EEG and fMRI to
investigate involved brain structures and processes. Violations of
sequential regularities were accompanied by increased activity in
premotor and cerebellar components of the“sequencing network,”
presumably reflecting a mismatch between expectations generated
by a forward model (cf. Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000) and the
observed stimuli – and an adjustment of the model. In addition,
lateral prefrontal areas were engaged when a sequence violation
required a boost in cognitive control. Stimuli deviating from a
context of standard stimuli by a certain feature (as in an odd-
ball paradigm), on the other hand, triggered responses in bilateral
posterior temporal and parietal areas, reflecting increased atten-
tion and perceptual processing (Bubic et al., 2009). Interestingly,
they also report differences in both the N2 and P3 components
between their expectation conditions. While the N2 exhibited
a shorter latency for sequential deviants compared to feature
deviants, the P3 peaked later in the first condition and had a
smaller amplitude. In line with the activation pattern reported
in their imaging study, both components had a more posterior
distribution for feature deviants. Additionally, they identified an
enhanced N1 component for feature deviants, suggesting an early
sensory registration of the irregularity (Bubic et al., 2010). The
authors take these findings as indication for distinct functional
networks involved in the processing of different types of expecta-
tion. It remains an interesting question whether similar functional
differences also apply to the distinction between self-generated
and externally cued expectation studied here.
CONCLUSION
Self-generated expectations differ from cue-induced expectations
on a range of cognitive processing stages and result in stronger
behavioral effects. Response time benefits for expected stimuli
are much larger when expectations are self-generated as com-
pared to externally cued. Higher amplitudes in both the N2 and
P3 components for violations of self-generated expectations indi-
cate increased premotoric preparation compared to cue-induced
expectations. This goes along with a missing benefit for stimuli
matching the expected response only and is mirrored in the LRP.
Underlying cognitive or neuronal functional differences between
these types of expectation remain a subject for future studies.
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